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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
EVANS V. STATE: SECTION 142 OF THE MARYLAND
PUBLIC SAFETY ARTICLE OF THE MARYLAND CODE DID
NOT CONTAIN A PENALTY PROVISION NOR A RELATED
PENAL TY; THEREFORE, THE ACT OF OBLITERATING,
REMOVING, OR ALTERING A MANUFACTURER'S
IDENTIFICATION MARK OR SERIAL NUMBER ON A
FIREARM WAS NOT A CRIME.
By: James Robinson
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that no crime exists when a
criminal statute lacks an internal or corresponding penalty provision.
Evans v. State, 420 Md. 391,23 A.3d 223 (2011). Specifically, the court
held that because the statute prohibiting the removal of a firearm's
identification mark or number contained no internal or related penalty
provision, due to legislative oversight, it did not constitute a crime. Id. at
414,23 A.3d at 236.
In 2007, Leroy Evans, Jr. ("Evans") was indicted on eleven drug and
firearm counts in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Count
Nine of the indictment charged Evans with violating section 5-142 of the
Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code, which prohibited the
"obliteration, removal, change, or alteration of a manufacture's
identification mark or number on a firearm." A jury convicted Evans on
Count Nine and the court sentenced him to five years incarceration,
running consecutively to the sentence for another count.
Evans appealed his five-year sentence for Count Nine to the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland. He argued that the trial court erred in
imposing a punishment for his violation of section 5-142 of the Public
Safety Article. However, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the trial court's conviction and sentence, holding that Evans'
removal of the serial number from the handgun amounted to illegal
possession of a regulated firearm and that a five-year prison term was
justified under the penalty provision in section 5-143(b) of the Public
Safety Article. In response, Evans filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The writ was granted to determine
whether his conviction under section 5-142 and his sentence under
section 5-143(b) were proper.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by emphasizing
that generally, criminal statutes must contain language that bans specific
behavior and prescribes a penalty for the prohibited act. Evans, 420 Md.
at 397, 23 A.3d at 226. Without an assigned penalty, the forbidden
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conduct is not a crime. Id. at 397-98,23 A.3d at 226 (citing WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(d), at 12 (5th ed. 2010». The court based
their reasoning on the basic principle that a criminal statute should be
reasonably explicit in order to put an ordinary person on notice of the
prohibited conduct and penalty for such behavior. Evans, 420 Md. at
398, 23 A.3d at 226 (citing Gargliano v. State, 334 Md. 428, 445 n.16,
639 A.2d 675,638 n.16 (1994».
Although typically located within the criminal statute, the court
acknowledged that the lack of an internal penalty provision does not
necessarily inhibit a statute's ability to criminalize conduct. Evans, 420
Md. at 398-99, 23 A.3d at 226-27. The court identified situations where a
criminal statute may reference another statute for punishment or refer to a
separate catch-all statute, to ensure that a person is punished in a
prescribed way. Id. (citing LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(d), at 12-13).
Additionally, a statute may classify behavior as a misdemeanor or felony
with another statute, indicating the permissible punishment for each
classification. Evans, 420 Md. at 398-99,23 A.3d at 227.
The court also cited a previous case in which the penalty provision for
the forbidden conduct of possessing unstamped cigarettes was located
under a different title of the Tax-General Article. Evans, 420 Md. at 399,
23 A.3d at 227 (citing Chen v. State, 370 Md. 99, 803 A.2d 518 (2002».
The court held that the two sections, despite their different locations
within the Maryland Article, could be read in pari materia so that the
penalty provision was applicable to the statutory provision. Evans, 420
Md. at 399, 23 A.3d at 227 (citing Chen, 370 Md. at 110, 803 A.2d at
524).
Similarly, the State argued that the penalty provision found in section
5-143 is linked to the prohibited conduct proscribed by section 5-142.
Evans, 420 Md. at 405-06, 23 A.3d at 230-31. In addressing this
assertion, the court relied on principles for statutory interpretation. Id. at
400, 23 A.3d at 228 (citing Ray v. State, 410 Md. 384, 978 A.2d 736
(2009». According to these principles, the court first considered the
plain language of the statute giving meaning to each word, sentence, and
clause. Evans, 420 Md. at 400, 23 A.3d at 228 (citing Ray, 410 Md. at
404-05, 978 A.2d at 747-48). When the language is still ambiguous, the
court then looks to the legislative history, intent, and overall statutory
scheme. Evans, 420 Md. at 400-01,23 A.3d at 228 (citing Ray, 410 Md.
at 404-05, 978 A.2d at 747-48).
Applying these principles, the court first compared the language that
described the forbidden conduct in section 5-142(a) to the language in
section 5-143(a). Evans, 420 Md. at 401-02, 23 A.3d at 228-29. The
court observed that section 5-142(a) prohibited the removal or
obliteration of the manufacturer's identification mark or number, while
section 5-143(a) addressed the specific actions of "illegal sale, rental,
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transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt." Id. at 405, 23 A.3d at 230.
According to the court, which cited Black's Law Dictionary and
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, the actions listed in the two
statutes are not synonymous. Id. at 405, 23 A.3d at 230-31.
The court also focused on the fact that the two statutes varied in their
basic applicability. Evans, 420 Md. at 401-02, 23 A.3d at 228-29.
Specifically, section 5-142 referred to "firearm" while section 5-143(b)
referred to "regulated firearms," a much narrower class of firearms,
which excludes shotguns and rifles. /d. The court found this distinction
meaningful and pointed out that the legislature could have easily
remedied the inconsistency as it had with other statutes. Id. at 404, 23
A.3d at 230.
Considering the State's argument that the legislative history of
sections 5-142 and 5-143 promoted a reconciliation of the two provisions,
the court expanded its focus on the actions of the legislature. Evans, 420
Md. at 406, 23 A.3d at 231. A thorough recitation of the legislative
history of the two statutes revealed that section 5-142's statutory
predecessors always contained an internal penalty or explicitly referenced
the penalty provision of another statute. /d. at 406-13,23 A.3d at 231-35.
However, in its 2003 effort to recodify sections of the Public Safety
Article and assign each statute an internal penalty provision, the
legislature unintentionally omitted the penalizing language from section
5-142. Id. at 411-12,23 A.3d at 234-35.
The court ultimately rejected the State's arguments and determined
that the absence of an internal penalty provision and the legislature's
failure to amend the term "firearm" to "regulated firearm," revealed that
section 5-142 was accidentally "orphaned" from a penalty provision.
Evans, 420 Md. at 413-14, 23 AJd at 235-36. Although the error was
clearly a legislative oversight, the court stated that it could not add or
correct the language. Id. at 414, 23 A.3d at 236 (citing Graves v. State,
364 Md. 329, 772 A.2d 1225 (2001». As such, the court held that section
5-142 did not constitute a crime and accordingly reversed the conviction
and vacated the sentence as to Count Nine. Evans, 420 Md. at 414, 23
A.3d at 236.
Applying strict statutory interpretation consistent with the basic
principles of criminal law, Evans held that a person must be on notice as
to specific prohibited conduct and its accompanying penalty, otherwise
there is no crime. This holding also reinforces the separation of powers
principle. Although the court recognized that the absent penalty
provision was a result of legislative oversight, it was unwilling to correct
the mistake because doing so would equate to lawmaking, a power
reserved to the legislature. Evans places defense attorneys on notice that
clients may have been convicted and sentenced for non-criminal conduct
if they committed the act of obliterating, removing, or altering the serial
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number on a firearm during the time when there was not a prescribed
penalty. Finally, prosecutors and judges should be aware that charging
defendants with this offense is improper and until the legislature remedies
the error, dismissal of the charge is the appropriate recourse.

